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The  Irish  healthcare  system  has  long  been  criticised  for a  number  of  perceived  weaknesses,
including  access  to healthcare  based  on ability-to-pay  rather  than  need.  Consequently,  in
2011, a newly  elected  government  committed  to the  development  of a universal,  single-
tier  system  based  on  need  and  ﬁnanced  through  Universal  Health  Insurance  (UHI).  This
article draws  on  the national  and  international  evidence  to identify  the potential  impact
of  the  proposed  model  on healthcare  expenditure  in  Ireland.  Despite  a pledge  that  health
spending  under  UHI  would  be  no  greater  than  in  the current  predominantly  tax-funded
model,  the  available  evidence  is suggestive  that  the proposed  model  involving  competing
insurers  would  increase  healthcare  expenditure,  in part  due  to an  increase  in administrativeHealthcare ﬁnancing
Health Care Reform costs  and  proﬁts.  As a result  the  proposed  model  of UHI appears  to be no  longer on the
political  agenda.  Although  the  Government  has  been  criticised  for abandoning  its model  of
UHI,  it has  done  so  based  on  national  and  international  evidence  about  the  relatively  high
additional  costs  associated  with  this  particular  model.
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1. Introduction
The Irish healthcare system is a complex mix of pub-
lic and private. The system is largely tax-funded, with 77
percent of total healthcare expenditure coming from gen-
eral taxation revenues in 2013; 9 percent from private
insurance and 12 percent from household out-of-pocket
expenditure [1]. Entitlement to healthcare is subject to a
complex system of eligibility categories [2]. Medical cards
are awarded on income grounds, with a higher income
threshold applying to persons aged 70 and over and with
some (ill-deﬁned) discretion to award cards where the
absence of a card may  cause undue hardship. Medical
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cardholders are eligible for a range of services without
signiﬁcant charge, although more recently prescription
charges have been introduced for this group. A small pro-
portion of those above the income threshold for a medical
card are entitled to a General Practitioner (GP) visit card
which provides free GP visits only. In the summer of 2015,
a GP visit card was extended to all children under the age
of 6, as well as those aged 70 and over. The remainder
of the population (approximately 56 percent) pay the full
cost associated with GP care, but are entitled to subsidised
public hospital care. However, due to long waits for public
hospital care, approximately 45 percent of the population
purchase private health insurance, which is assumed to
secure faster access.
In both primary and hospital settings, publicly ﬁnanced
and privately ﬁnanced care is often administered by the
same staff using the same facilities [3]. In primary care, all
GPs work in a private market, although most have public
patients (those with a medical or GP visit card) and pri-
vate patients (those without a medical or GP visit card). In
 access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.
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he hospital sector, there are separate public and private
ospitals, but within public hospitals consultants can treat
atients on a private basis [3]. Ireland has the only Euro-
ean health system that does not offer universal coverage
f primary care [4]. There is evidence of ﬁnancial barri-
rs to access, unmet need for care and relatively high user
harges in primary and hospital settings, when compared
o other EU countries [4]. Private patients can achieve faster
ccess to the public acute hospital sector. People who can
fford to pay privately can more rapidly access diagnostics
nd a ﬁrst specialist appointment which facilitate speedier
ccess for public hospital treatment. A block grant system
sed to reimburse for public patients results in an incentive
o treat fewer public patients as each patient represents
 cost; in contrast, per diem charges for private patients
rovide an incentive for hospitals to treat more private
atients. Similarly, consultants receive a salary for treat-
ng public patients and a fee-for-service for the treatment
f private patients. These alternative payment methods for
ublic and private patients incentivise “two-tier” access to
ospital care, in which the wait time for private patients is
igniﬁcantly shorter [5].
In 2011 a newly elected coalition government commit-
ed to far-reaching healthcare reform for Ireland, which
ncluded the development of a universal, single-tier health
ervice, which guarantees access to medical care based on
eed, not income [6]. The proposals also committed to a
hange to the manner in which Irish healthcare is ﬁnanced,
ith the introduction of Universal Health Insurance (UHI).
ome three years later, a White Paper was published which
roposed how this reform might be achieved [7]. The White
aper provided little detail on the potential cost implica-
ions of the proposed reforms, although it was noted that
pending by the State on healthcare under a single-tier UHI
ystem should not exceed spending under the two-tier sys-
em which it replaces. Following publication of a report
xamining the cost implications of the White Paper pro-
osals [1], the Minister for Health announced that “the high
osts for the particular model of health insurance.  . . are
ot acceptable, either now or any time in the future” [8]. In
he election campaign of February 2016, the outgoing coali-
ion government parties continued to express their support
or universal healthcare but their approach to ﬁnancing
niversality was unclear [9,10] with the Taoiseach (Prime
inister) suggesting that UHI should remain the ﬁnancing
odel but the nature of the UHI system required further
esearch [11]. Some opposition parties advocated tax-
unded, NHS-style reforms [12]. Although the Taoiseach
as re-elected to head the incoming 2016 Government,
is minority government will require support from oppo-
ition deputies to pass any legislation [13]. Early signs of
upport for reaching cross-party consensus on a long-term
pproach to reform of Irish healthcare will require recon-
iling quite divergent views to succeed [14,15].
This paper examines the proposed reforms for the Irish
ealthcare system as set out in the 2014 White Paper and
ssesses their potential implications for healthcare expen-
iture in Ireland. Section 2 details differences between the
urrent and proposed health system in Ireland. Section
 examines how the proposed changes might inﬂuence
ealthcare expenditure in Ireland. Section 4 discusses thelicy 120 (2016) 790–796 791
implications of health system reform in Ireland. Section 5
concludes.
2. The proposed reforms
Under the White Paper proposals, general taxation
would remain as the core mechanism for raising healthcare
revenues; however, UHI would ﬁnance aspects of pri-
mary and hospital care. Under the proposed system, every
member of the population would be insured for the same
package of healthcare services [7], though while offer-
ing some proposals in this regard, the White Paper does
not identify deﬁnitively which services should be ﬁnanced
via health insurance. People would purchase insurance for
this standard package from one of a number of compet-
ing health insurers. Financial support would be available
to ensure affordability by directly paying or subsidis-
ing from taxation the cost of insurance premiums for all
those who  qualify. The proposed system would entail a
purchaser–provider split with the purchasing of primary
and hospital care largely devolved to insurers. Health insur-
ers would purchase care for their members from primary
care providers, independent not-for-proﬁt hospital trusts
and private hospitals. Insurers would be free to engage in
selective contracting with healthcare providers. As part of
the transition to UHI, a model for ﬁnancing public hospital
care based on Money Follows the Patient (MFTP) was pro-
posed involving a shift from the current block grant budgets
with adjustment for the volume and complexity of activ-
ity to a new system where hospitals are paid for the actual
level of activity agreed.
The multi-payer, competing insurer model outlined in
the White Paper is, to a large extent, based on the Dutch
model of social health insurance (introduced in 2006) and
marks a signiﬁcant departure from the current healthcare
system in Ireland. Despite this, the potential implications
of the reforms received relatively little attention; perhaps
because of uncertainty about the timing of the implemen-
tation of the proposed reforms as well as a lack of detail
about how the proposed system would operate in practice.
A small number of studies have identiﬁed a number of
potential issues that may  arise if a Dutch style health sys-
tem were implemented in Ireland. Ryan and colleagues, for
example, noted that a successful shift to a Dutch ﬁnancing
system could result in a more equitable healthcare system
in Ireland as it would abolish different entitlement for dif-
ferent groups; however, they questioned whether the Irish
health system has the capacity (in terms of acute hospital
beds and human resources) for the service delivery asso-
ciated with such a system [16]. Similar issues were raised
by Turner [17] who also questioned the affordability of pre-
miums  for those currently without private health insurance
who would be obligated to purchase insurance under the
proposed system.
3. Impact of the proposals on healthcare
expenditure3.1. Change in method for ﬁnancing healthcare
Previous research suggests that tax-ﬁnanced health sys-
tems tend to have lower levels of healthcare expenditure
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Table 1
Features of the Irish healthcare system – current and proposed.
Health system characteristic Current system Proposed system
Source of ﬁnancing Predominantly tax ﬁnanced, supplemented by
private health insurance and out-of-pocket
expenditure
Introduction of Universal Health Insurance
(purchased by individuals with ﬁnancial support
from taxation revenues for qualifying individuals)
to  ﬁnance some services; general taxation to
remain as the core ﬁnancing mechanism
Number of payers One large payer (the Health Service Executive
(HSE)) and a number of smaller payers in the form
of private health insurance companies and private
individuals
Multiple competing private insurers for
UHI-ﬁnanced services; the HSE or some other
entity for tax-ﬁnanced services
Separation between purchasers
and providers
Limited – HSE main purchaser and provider of
healthcare within the public system
Proposed separation between providers and
purchasers
Reimbursing providers Mixed – differs for public and private patients.
Lump sum budgets for hospitals, salary for
consultants in the public sector, capitation plus
fees for GPs in the public sector, fee-for-service for
consultants and GPs in the private sector
Money Follows the Patient (MFTP) for UHI
ﬁnanced hospital services
Patient cost-sharing Medical card holders – limited cost sharing for
prescription items
Non-medical card holders – full price of GP care
(average price D 50–D 55), prescription items up to
D  144 a month, D 100 a night hospital care up to
D  750 a year
Unclear; anticipated that GP care will be free at the
point of use, however some co-payments will
likely remain (for example, for pharmaceuticals)than systems ﬁnanced through social insurance [18,19].
There are a number of potential reasons for this including,
for example, that social health insurance revenue is ear-
marked and therefore potentially less subject to political
and economic inﬂuence than taxation revenue [20]. Alter-
natively higher expenditure may  be related to increased
activity within social insurance based systems or could
be explained by features or characteristics more generally
associated with social insurance, rather than the ﬁnancing
mechanism per se. The following sections identify the fea-
tures of the Irish healthcare system which would change
under the proposed system (Table 1) and discusses the
potential impact on healthcare expenditure.
3.1.1. Single versus multi-payer system
At present a single organisation (the Health Service
Executive (HSE)) is largely responsible for paying and
providing publicly funded healthcare, with private care
(within the acute hospital sector at least) largely ﬁnanced
through private health insurance. Under the proposed sys-
tem of UHI, a multi-payer, competing insurer model will
operate with the purchasing of UHI-ﬁnanced healthcare
services largely devolved to insurers (Table 1). It is pro-
posed that the existence of multiple payers may  facilitate
competition and encourage insurers to reduce their costs
and premiums in a bid to attract more customers [7]; how-
ever the available evidence does not readily support this
assertion [21–23].
There are a number of reasons why a single-payer sys-
tem may  result in lower healthcare expenditure than a
system with multiple payers, including lower adminis-
trative costs and a greater ability to control healthcare
expenditure. A single payer can realise economies of
scale in administration [24], while multiple payers mean
duplicative claims-processing facilities and smaller insured
groups, both of which increase overhead costs [25]. Theuse of competing, for-proﬁt insurers within a multi-payer
system may  further increase expenditure as marketing
expenses and proﬁt drive up cost. While the rationale for
competition is increased efﬁciency, the level of competi-
tion is often limited so that the anticipated effect is not
observed in practice [23,26].
Within a multi-payer system, additional transaction
costs may  also be imposed on healthcare providers because
they interact with a multiple of potential payers. Interac-
tions increase with payers’ attempts to manage care, such
as requiring prior authorisation for certain services [27].
In addition, each payer will likely have different insurance
products, a different list of approved drugs and different
rules for billing and submitting claims [27]. Himmelstein
et al., for example, found that higher hospital administra-
tive costs in the US and the Netherlands are explained by
the use of per patient billing as opposed to lump-sum budg-
ets; as well as a requirement that hospitals bargain over
payment rates with multiple payers, whose documentation
requirements and billing procedures often vary [28].
Evidence from the Netherlands suggests that attempts
to control healthcare costs by encouraging price compe-
tition between insurers did not work out as anticipated;
while insurers were successful in reducing their operating
costs, it was  not sufﬁcient to control total expenditure as
these costs amounted to only 7 percent of insurers’ expen-
diture [29]. If competing insurers are to drive down costs
meaningfully, they must be able to bargain with health
service providers. Such selective contracting is relatively
rare in the Netherlands [30] and may  be even less viable
in Ireland due to relative population density [31]. Popula-
tion density is six times greater in the Netherlands than
Ireland and consequently Dutch hospitals tend to be closer
together than Irish hospitals. While there are multiple
teaching hospitals in Dublin, there are many fewer hos-
pitals in other parts of the country. This could give many
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ospitals local monopoly status [31]. Where hospitals are
urther apart, consumers may  be less willing to travel
eyond a local hospital. An insurer who contracts selec-
ively may  lose market share as enrolees switch to another
nsurer. Selective contracting could result in geographical
arriers in accessing care if insurers do not contract with
ocal hospitals; therefore while concern around equity was
ne of the reasons for the introduction of the proposed
eforms, the model may  introduce new equity concerns.
urthermore, price competition between insurers appears
o conﬂict with the principle of equal access based on need
ather than ability to pay, which the White Paper states as
 key objective of the reform [7].
.1.2. Separation between purchasers and providers
It is proposed that the role of the HSE as both a
urchaser and provider of healthcare be replaced by a
urchaser–provider split within the hospital sector for
HI-ﬁnanced services, with private insurers purchasing
ealthcare on behalf of their enrolees and hospitals orga-
ised into a series of not-for-proﬁt trusts.
Often a purchaser–provider model is introduced with
he aim of controlling healthcare expenditure [32]. How-
ver, the potential impact of such a model on expenditure
s somewhat ambiguous. In the UK an internal mar-
et within the health system was introduced in 1991,
y separating purchasers from providers and by encour-
ging competition among providers. Providers became
uasi-independent entities managing their own budgets
nd ﬁnancing them through contracts with purchasers
32]. The impact of this purchaser–provider split on
ealthcare expenditure is unclear – one researcher noted
hat while there was some evidence of an increase in
fﬁciency after the introduction of the quasi-market,
dministrative costs also increased [33]. In New Zealand,
 purchaser–provider split was introduced in 1993 with
he aim of achieving greater efﬁciency and containing
verall healthcare expenditure [32]. Despite attempts to
stimate the cost of contracting between purchasers and
roviders, accurate estimates are not available [34]. There
s no evidence to suggest that the purchaser–provider
plit resulted in any major efﬁciency gains in the hospital
ector [35].
.1.3. Paying providers
Provider reimbursement in Ireland is somewhat
nusual in that the method used differs depending on
hether the patient being treated is a public or private
atient. For GPs an annual capitation payment is made for
ach patient holding a medical or GP visit card on their
ist; while they are paid a fee-for-service for each service
eceived by a private patient. Hospitals are largely reim-
ursed using budget allocations with adjustment for the
olume and complexity of activity for the treatment of
ublic patients. Additionally, within the acute public hos-
ital system, the treatment of private patients represents
n additional income stream due to the associated charges
evied on private patients [3]; in receiving treatment in a
rivate-designated bed in an acute public hospitals, private
atients are liable for a maintenance charge in addition to
he public hospital inpatient charge. Similarly, consultantslicy 120 (2016) 790–796 793
receive a salary for treating public patients and a fee-for-
service for the treatment of private patients with the extent
of private practice contractually agreed, generally at a max-
imum of 20 percent.
In the White Paper, a system of MFTP where hospitals
are paid for the actual level of activity agreed based on a
system of diagnosis related groups is proposed. The move
towards MFTP creates incentives to increase the number
of patients treated and reduce cost per case [36], but it
can have negative consequences including skimping on
quality.
In Ireland, there is some evidence to suggest that when
MFTP was piloted in a number of orthopaedic sites in
Ireland, that volume of activity increased, while length of
stay reduced [37]; while in England, where activity-based
funding of hospital services was  introduced progressively,
Farrar and colleague [36] found that length of stay fell more
quickly and the proportion of day cases increased more
quickly where payment by results was implemented, sug-
gesting a reduction in the unit costs of care associated with
payment by results.
Under a system of UHI, it is anticipated that GP visits
will be free at the point of use. While the White Paper did
not specify how GPs would be remunerated, it has been
assumed that GPs will be paid by a combination of capi-
tation and some fee payments [1], as is the case with the
recent introduction of free GP visits for those aged under
6 and 70 and over. The potential impact of such a move is
twofold including an increase in demand for GP services
for those with a reduced price (examined in Section 3.1.4)
and a potential change in behaviour by GPs in response to a
change in reimbursement, including promoting long-term
preventive healthcare or seeking alternative providers of
care. However, capitation payment may  encourage practi-
tioners to hold larger patient list sizes in order to maximise
income, which may  result in a higher workload and shorter
consultations [38]. Also it may  result in ‘cream-skimming’
as providers seek out low-risk patients [39]. However, the
cost implications of a change in remuneration will largely
depend (at least in the ﬁrst instance) on the rate at which
capitation is set, which will likely be determined through
negotiations between government and GP representative
groups.
3.1.4. Patient cost-sharing
In the current healthcare system in Ireland, private
patients pay the full cost of accessing the GP (Table 1), while
also paying out-of-pocket for prescribed medication. Gov-
ernment policy outlined in the Programme for Government
noted that “Universal primary care will remove fees for GP
care” (6, p. 32). However less clear is how the removal of
fees at the point of use will impact on demand for such ser-
vices, with the magnitude of this effect depending on the
price elasticity of demand for GP services. O’Reilly and col-
leagues found that 26 percent of private patients in Ireland
reported having a medical problem but not visiting the GP
because of cost, suggesting the existence of an unmet need
which may  increase demand if user fees are reduced [40].
Nolan found for those gaining free primary care, there was
an increase in the annual number of GP visits by between
27 and 39 percent [41].
ealth P794 S. Connolly, M.-A. Wren / H
While the provision of GP care free at the point of use
will shift cost from private individuals to the state, the
impact on total expenditure is less clear. Assuming that
GPs will be reimbursed via capitation, the impact on total
expenditure will largely be determined by the rate at which
capitation is set. However an increase in GP expenditure
could result in a decrease in total healthcare expenditure if
it results in a move away from more costly secondary care
services, with, for example, Starﬁeld and Shi ﬁnding that
the better the orientation towards primary care, the lower
the total healthcare costs, possibly partly because of better
preventive care and lower hospitalisation rates [42].
3.2. Towards an estimate of the potential cost of UHI in
Ireland
A number of commentators criticised the White Paper
on UHI for its failure to include any estimates of the cost of
the proposed model; though a major difﬁculty in comple-
ting such a costing analysis is the lack of detail about how
the proposed model would operate in practice, including
what basket of services would be ﬁnanced through UHI.
In November 2015, a report was published detailing the
potential cost implications of the proposed model [1]. In
costing the proposed model of UHI, the analysis adopted
assumptions about various aspects of the proposed model
including what basket of services would be ﬁnanced by UHI
and the additional costs associated with ﬁnancing health-
care through multiple, competing insurers.
The analysis estimated that the proposed model of
UHI would increase healthcare expenditure in Ireland by
between 3.5 and 10.7 percent per annum, translating into
a mean per capita UHI cost ranging from D 1600 to D 2509
[1]. The wide range reﬂects uncertainties in the proposed
model, including the basket of services to be ﬁnanced by
UHI. While some of this additional expenditure was  related
to the provision of services not provided in the current sys-
tem, the authors found that a major driver of the increase
was the additional cost that arises from ﬁnancing health-
care through multiple, competing insurers. Initially it was
assumed that the UHI system would not be subject to EU
competition law. However, the Minister for Health con-
cluded following policy and legal analysis that ‘it was not
possible to frame a system based on competing insurers in
a multi-payer model that would be exempt from competi-
tion law’ [43], thereby severely limiting the Government’s
ability to control factors such as pricing and insurers mar-
gins [1] and therefore overall healthcare expenditure.
4. Discussion
The available evidence suggests that ﬁnancing uni-
versal healthcare in Ireland via a system of competitive
health insurers would lead to an increase in total health-
care expenditure. Although the White Paper model of
UHI, as a means of ﬁnancing universal healthcare, no
longer appears to be on the political agenda; there
does appear to be a continuing political commitment to
universality.
Achieving universal healthcare in Ireland requires an
examination of the options to fund universal coverage:olicy 120 (2016) 790–796
there are no easy paths [44]. Each ﬁnancing option comes
with its own  advantages and disadvantages, though the
available evidence is suggestive that healthcare expendi-
ture tends to be higher in social insurance ﬁnanced systems
relative to tax-ﬁnanced [18,19]. Further what works in one
country may  not necessarily work in another given that
the ﬁnancing system of each country is a product of social
and economic considerations speciﬁc to the country at the
time of the development. In the US, for example, scepticism
about government and a strong aversion to taxes has con-
tributed to an aversion to ﬁnancing universal healthcare
coverage through this mechanism [45]. While in the UK,
the feasibility of introducing social insurance as a means
of ﬁnancing healthcare was  questioned given that the UK
may  not have the sorts of social institutions manifest in
many European countries that made the adoption of social
insurance desirable there [46].
Although the White Paper of 2014 has been rejected
as a blueprint for reform, given the political and policy
consensus about the need to reform the Irish healthcare
system, some lessons can be drawn from the experience.
Firstly before legislating for, and implementing signiﬁ-
cant reform, it is necessary to identity and analysis the
potential impact of the reforms on a variety of outcomes,
including but not limited to cost. Studies such as this
could advance the policy discussion without requiring
that elected ofﬁcials make unnecessary early commitments
[45]. Doing it earlier rather than later would facilitate
the identiﬁcation and resolution of problems for this
and other reform alternatives [45]. Further discussion of
healthcare ﬁnance reform should be considered alongside
more general budgetary issues and challenges including
expected demographic and epidemiological changes [45].
Secondly, reform of the nature identiﬁed in the White Paper
takes time. In Iceland, for example, in moving from social
health insurance towards tax-based ﬁnancing for health-
care, there was a signiﬁcant transition period (from 1972
to 1989), when sickness funds were retained but received
their funding completely from tax payments [32]. While
in the Netherlands reform of the health ﬁnancing system
occurred following 20 years of discussion and debate, and
ten years after the implementation of legislation is still
regarded as reform in progress [47]. Time is needed to
explain the proposals and to identify and work out prob-
lems for policy, healthcare providers and the public, as well
as to alleviate public concerns about signiﬁcant changes
in areas as important as healthcare, health insurance and
taxes [45].
5. Conclusions
After a number of years of discussion and the publi-
cation of a White Paper, the ﬁnancing model to achieve
universal healthcare in Ireland remains uncertain and con-
tested, in large part due to the expected costs associated
with the 2011 Government’s proposed model. While Irish
political parties have mostly stated a commitment to uni-
versal healthcare, advancement on this objective over the
next ﬁve years will require achieving cross-party sup-
port following the February 2016 general election, which
returned a minority government dependent on opposition
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eputies’ agreement to pass legislation. The new Govern-
ent’s programme does not mention UHI; however it does
ote that further work is required to identify the best way
o ﬁnance universal healthcare [48]. While the outgoing
overnment has been criticised for abandoning its model
f UHI, it did so based on national and international evi-
ence about the relatively high additional costs associated
ith this model.
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